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H – 673

International Court of Justice

H0673-0002

Notice.

Not to be published until presented before the tribunal in open court and then only that portion actually submitted as evidence.

Ne pas publier avant présentation devant le tribunal en audience publique et seulement la partie réellement versée au dossier.

Nicht zu veroeffentlichen vor Darlegung vor dem Gericht (Tribunal) in oeffentlicher Sitzung und dann nur jenen Teil, welcher tatsaechlich zur Beweisfuehrung uebermittelt wurde.

Не публиковать до того, как представлено на публичном заседании Трибунала и только ту часть, которая представлена в качестве доказательства.

H0673-0003

I certify that none of the documents included herein have been denied by the Tribunal and that this document book has been examined with the prosecution in accordance with the ruling of the Tribunal dated 4 April 1946.

Je certife qu'aucun des documents ci-inclus n'a été contesté par le Tribunal, et que ce livre de documents a été examiné par le Ministére Public suivant les règles du Tribunal, en date du 4 Avril 1946.

Ich bestaetige, dass keine der hierin enthaltenen Dokuments vom Gerichtshof abgelehnt wurden und dass dieses Dokumentenbuch gemeinsam mit der Anklagevertretung durchgesehen wurde, in Uebereinstimmung mit der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes vom 4. April 1946.

Signature of Counsel

Signature de l'Avocat

Unterschrift des Verteidigers.

H0673 - 0004

Professor Dr. HERMANN JAHREISS

Defense Counsel for the defendant JODL

NUERNBERG,

11. 4. 1946

Court house

To the Translation Division

of the International Military Tribunal

in Nuernberg

Re: JODL Document Book.

In the document JO 52 (page 155 of the Book) may I ask you to take note of:

The word "nachr." means, in military terminology " nachrichtlich ", which means that the receiver was informed of the contents of the document merely for his information.

s/ JAHRREISS

t/ (Prof. Dr. JAHRREISS)

(Page 1 of Orig.)

Cover Page of Document Jo.1

Excerpt from PS 1780 (U.S.A.72)

JODL's Diary 1937/1939

Presented by the American Prosecution on the morning of 29 Nov. 1945 as on Page 356 of the German Minutes.

H0673 - 0005

H0673 – 0006

1937

22 March Meeting at GOERING's. The request of the SS for increased border security through SS is justified by the infiltration of Communists, Saboteurs and assassins; a strengthening of the outposts of the Gestapo by 4000 troops is granted. Border Defense Corps rejected.

.....

19 April H. visits Chief of Armaments Office. Talks about his ideas concerning development of the SS.

.....

1938

.....

3 Feb. .....11 o'clock. Gen.THOMAS informs that the Liaison Officer to the Ministry of Economics and to the General - plenipotentiary Col.DREWS has visited him by order of SCHACHT. He was of the opinion that the SS employed all means to implicate the Army and to press her against the wall in its present weak state.

.....

10 Feb Gen. KEITEL and Adm. CANARIS in Karinhall.

HIMMLER is supposedly distressed that high officers of the Army had made unheard of accusations against him.

.....

26 Feb CANARIS relates, in what unworthy fashion Lt.Gen. v. FRITSCH's examination by the SS took place. Gen. v. VIEBAHN was shocked. If the troops would find that out, there would be revolution.

.....

I hereby certify that the above document is a true excerpt from Doc. PS 1780 (USA 72).

NUERNBERG 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0007

(Page 1/2 of orig.) Coversheet for document Jo 2.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Excerpts from P.S. 1809 (GB 88)

JODL's diary for the year 1940

Submitted by the American Prosecution on the forenoon of 7 December 1945 according to page 858 of the German minutes.

H0673 - 0008

4

(Page of orig.)

Jo 2

(Excerpt from PS 1809)

Copy

2 copies

2nd copies

Diary of General JODL (WA) includes period from

I. February - 26 May 1940

. . . . . .

SS. Mag. . . .

The unlimited plan for expansion of the SS sounds generally suspicious.

- -

I hereby certify that the document reproduced above is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 1809 (92 SS)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. E [illegible]

H0673 - 0009

(Page 5 of orig.)

Cover sheet of Document Jo 3

Excerpts from document PS 1780 (USA 72)

From JODL's diary for the years 1937/38

Sumbitted by the American Prosecution at noon 29 November 1945 referring to Page 356 of the German protocol.

H0673-0010

(Excerpt from PS 1780)

1938

2.2. General ADAM asked while riding what the situation was with regard to the state crisis. I replied that it had reached a climax. I can say no more. Minister FRANK asked him, what do you say to your Field Marshal. A. said, he is not our Field Marshal, but yours!!

Only in isolated cases does one find human dignity and the recognition that the Armed Forces have to stand together. Each crack which they reveal in themselves offers other forces the welcome opportunity to break into the structure. I advise General KEITEL to be extremely careful with all changes of personnel so that for political reasons no inavertible damage will be done. We cannot afford to lose our best senior officers of the army and army groups since they are irreplaceable, only absolutely necessary changes may be made.

3.2. 08.00 hour at the Chief of the WA. He is very depressed. The Fuehrer and Goering are drawing more and more away from von BRAUCHITSCH in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and inclining toward REICHENAU. General K. does not know how he should take this. He is strongly convinced that this promotion will lead to the 3rd, and greatest shock of all, to the army. General K. will bear the odium that he favored this solution or at least did not prevent it, and he will have to be quiet and will not be able to say how strongly he had fought against it. I support this opinion, every means has to be tried to avert this disaster. A great part of the senior generals will leave. General BECK will not remain.

H0673 - 0011

(Page 7 of orig.)

Jo 3

(Excerpt from PS 1780)

GGeneral HALDER will not agree to be REICHENAU's Chief of the General Staff; they won't be able to work together. General K. has again requested an appointment with the Fuehrer.

.....

1400 hours Chief of the WA informs me, that the battle has been won. The Fuehrer has decided that General von BRAUCHITSCH would be appointed the Supreme Commander of the Army. We both feel much better. Now we can hope to weather the heavy blow which has struck the Armed Forces. Doubts have been brought up against HALDER because of his strong Catholic ties. General K. succeeded in eliminating these doubts by soldierly and military reasons. The best thing would be if General BECK could decide to remain.

.....

I herewith certify that the above document is a true copy of document PS 1780 (USA 72).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Professor Dr. EXNER

H0673-0012

Coversheet to Document Jo 4

Excerpt from PS 2261 (USA 24)

Transmittal of a Copy of the Reich Defense Law

Submitted by the American prosecution on 26 Nov 1945 in the morning according to page 156 of the German transcript.

H0673-0013

Jo 4
(Excerpt from PS 2261)

C O P Y .

The Reich Minister of War
and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
No. 1820/35 Top Secret L II a

Berlin, 24 June 1935

To
The Supreme Commander of the Army
The Supreme Commander of the Navy
The Supreme Commander of the Air Forces.

Enclosed, I transmit one copy each of the Reich Defense Law of the 21 May 1935 and of a decision of the Reich Cabinet of 21 May 1935 concerning the Reich Defense Council. The publication of the Reich Defense Law is temporarily suspended by order of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor.

The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has nominated the President of the Directorate of the Reich Bank Dr. SCHACHT to be "Plenipotentiary General for War Economy".

I request that the copies of the Reich Defense Law needed within the branches of the armed forces be ordered before 1 July 1935 at the armed forces office (L) where it is to be established with the request that the law shall only be distributed down to Corps Headquarters outside of the Reich Ministry of War.

I point out the necessity of strictest secrecy once more.

(Signed) von VLOMBERG

- - - - - - - -

L
No. 1820/35 Top Secret II a

Berlin, 3 Sept 1935

To
Defense Economic Group G-3 (W.Wi.-Gruppe I a)

Copy transmitted
(signed) JODL

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document 2261-PS, (USA 24).

Nuernberg, 12 Mar 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673 – 0014

Cover sheet to document Jo.....5.....

Extract of Document EC 405 (GB 160)

Minutes of the 10th session of the Executive Committee OF The Reich Defense Council of 26 June 1935

Presented by the British Prosecution in the morning session of 9 January 1946 in accordance with page 2232 of the German records.

H0673-0015

(Excerpt from EC 405)

TOP SECRET

MINUTES

of the 10th session of the Executive Committee

of the Reich Defense Council

Time: 26 June 1935 Opening: 1000 hours
Close : 1240 hours

Location: Large conference hall of the Reich Ministry of War.

.....

Lt. Col. JODL (W.W.A.(L):

.....

The demilitarized zone requires special treatment. The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor has proclaimed in his speech of 21 May 1935 and in other declarations that the provisions of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact for the demilitarized zone are being observed. To the "aide memoire" of the French envoy of 17 June 1935 about "Provisional Authorities in the Demilitarized Zone" the German Reich government has replied that neither the civilian provisional authorities nor other authorities have been entrusted with mobilization duties such as the establishment, rearmament and issuing of arms to any formation in case of war or the preparation thereof.

Since at the present time foreign political entanglements must be avoided under all circumstances, only undeniable necessary preparatory work must be allowed to take place in the demilitarized zone. The fact of such preparatory work or plans in connection with it fall within the limits of the strictest secrecy in the zone itself as well as also

H0673-0016

continuation of Jo 5

(Excerpt from EC 405)

---

in the remainder of the Reich.

This preparatory work particularly includes;

a) Mobilization measures of the Provincial Police (Landespolizei) and the Security Police (Schutzpolizei) as well as the Rural Police (Gendarmerie).

b) Mobilization measures of the transportation and communication system.

c) Preparation for "Freeing of the Rhine".

d) Preparation of local security.

e) Preparation of a reinforced Frontier Control Service. (Grenzaufsichtsdienst).

f) Preparation of restricted areas (Sperrmassnahmen).

g) Execution of preparatory inspections of horses and motor vehicles.

h) Preparation of evacuation measures.

i) Mobilization measures for manpower control.

k) Preparation of the economic mobilization.

The issuance of written directives for mobilization purposes is permissible only as far as it is of vital necessity for the smooth execution of the measures planned for the demilitarized zone. Their storage in steel safes (Panzerschraenken) must be guaranteed without exception. The weapons, equipment, insignia, fieldgrey uniform, and items of equipment must not be shown. Preparatory exercises for mobilization, formations, and training with military weapons are prohibited. I am pointing out to all administrations participating in the mobilization preparations in the demilitarized zone the caution which the present political situation demands, and emphasize in particular, that in contrast to the rest of the Reich the basic principle of "Concealment proceeds action" must apply at present to the demilitarized zone.

I herewith certify that the above copied document is a true excerpt of Document EC 405 (GB 160).

Nuernberg, 21 March 46

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0017

(Page 13 of orig.) Cover sheet to document Jo.....6...

Extract of Document EC 407 (GB 247)

Minutes of the 12th session of the Reich

Defense Counsel.

Presented to court by the British Prosecution.

H0673 - 0018

(Excerpt from EC-407)

14 May 1936

Minutes

of the 12th meeting of the Reich Defense Council

(Page 27) Lt. Col. WAGNER (OKH)

.....

The outcome of the war has left a completely changed military, political situation in the event of a future war, namely the necessity for waging it in one's own country.

.....

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document EC 407 (GB 247).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673 – 0019

Cover sheet of Document Jo 7

Excerpt from PS 1780 (USA 72)

JODL's Diary 1937/1939

Presented by the American prosecution on 29 November 1945 in the morning session in accordance with page 356 of the German transcript.

(Page 16
of Orig.)

Jo . . 7 . . . . .

(Excerpt from Document
PS 1780)

1937

13 December The General Field Marshal after having described the situation reports on the status of the war potential of the Wehrmacht, whose greatest difficulty lies in the insufficient supply of ammunition of the army- 10-25 days of combat - 6 week's supply.

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 1780 (USA 72).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673 - 0020

H0673 - 0021

Coversheet to Document Jo.8..

Excerpt from Document C 175 (USA 69)

Directive for the unified preparation for war by the Armed Forces of 24 June 1937.

Submitted by the American prosecution on 29 November 1945 in the morning according to page 349 of the German transcript.

H0673 – 0022

Jo 8.....

(Excerpt from C 175)

The Reich Minister for War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

No. 55/37 g. K. Top Secret L Ia.

Berlin, 24 June 1937

Top Secret

Only via officer

Subject : "Directive 1937/38"

Reference : W.A. 36/36 Top Secret LIa of 26 June 36.

(Handwritten notes)

4 copies
2nd Copy.

(Remark in ink.)
H I op.34/37 Top Secret
Top Secret Received 25 June

Written by Officer

Outgoing documents in connection with this matter, and dealing with it in principle, are to be written by an officer.

.....

D i r e c t i v e

for the unified Preparation for war of the Armed Forces

(Valid from 1 July 1937 until presumably 30 Sep 1938)

Enclosed "Directive for Unified Preparation for War of the Armed Forces" comes into force on 1 July 1937. At the same time the "Directives for the unified preparation of a possible war by W.A., Army, Navy and Air Force" will be cancelled and is to be returned to W.A. (L.Ia) with covering letter by 10 July 37.

I request the forwarding to me of the results of the considerations to be made. according to part 3. of the Directive by 1. 9. 37.

(Signed) v. BLOMBERG

H0673-0023

(Excerpt from C 175)

(Enclosure)

Directive

for the unified preparation for war of the Armed Forces

(Valid from 1 July 37 until presumably 30 September 1938)

Contents

		Page
Part 1:	General Guiding Principles	3 to 8
Part 2:	Likely Warlike Eventualities (Concentrations)	9 to 17
Part 3:	Special Preparations	18 to 22

Part 1.

General Guiding Principles

1) The general political position justifies the supposition that Germany need not consider an attack from any side. Chief grounds for this are, in addition to the lack of desire for war in almost all nations, particularly the Western Powers, the deficiencies in the preparedness for war of a number of states and of Russia in particular.

The intention to unleash a European war is held just as little by Germany. Nevertheless the politically fluid world situation, which does not preclude surprising incidents, demands a continuous preparedness for war of the German Armed Forces. ...

2).....

3) Among the probable warlike eventualities for which concentration plans will be drafted are:

I) War on two fronts with the focal point in the West (Concentration "Red")

II) War on two fronts with the focal point in the South East (Concentration "Green")

for details see part 2 of the directive.

H0673 – 0024

Jo 8 continued

(Excerpt from C 175)

4) Special preparations are to be made for the following eventualities:

I) Armed intervention against Austria (Special case Otto).

II) Warlike entanglements with Red Spain (Special case Richard).

III) England, Poland, Lithuania take part in a war against us. (Special case "Enlargement Red/Green")

.....

5) The above directive refers only to the unified preparation for a war and to the general strategic points, which have to be observed in case of the opening of hostilities.

Pursuant to this directive, the branches of the Armed forces must complete their deployment etc., plans or make new ones, and must communicate with each other while doing this in order to eliminate all discrepancies before the issue of the directives, asking if necessary for a decision by me.

The directive for the conduct of the war itself and the definition of the objects of the war which depend on the general political as well as military and economic situation at the beginning of a war will be given through me by the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander.

(signed) v BLOMBERG

H0673 - 0025

Jo 8 ... continued

(Excerpt from C 175)

Part 2.

Probable warlike eventualities.

(Concentrations)

The following suppositions, aims and tasks will be made the basis for the treatment of the probable warlike eventualities (concentrations).

I) War on two fronts with focal point in the West

(Concentration "Red")

.....

II) War on two fronts with focal point, South East.

(Concentration "Green")

(handwritten addition is replaced by OB d W 94/37 of 7 December 1937

(Part II has been crossed out)

Part 3.

Special Preparations.

The following "special cases" are to be considered inside the High Commands generally without participation by outside authorities.

H0673-0026

To 8 ... continued

(Excerpt from C 175)

I) Special Case "Otto".

"Armed intervention in Austria in the event of her restoring the monarchy".

The object of this operation will be to compel Austria by armed force to renounce a restoration.

.....

II) Special Case "Richard"

"Warlike entanglements with Red Spain."

.....

III) Special Case "Extension Red/Green".

.....

a) England.....

b) Poland.....

c) Lithuania.....

.....

Post Scriptum (signed/ VON BLOMBERG

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 175 (USA 69).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

Cover Page to Doc.Jo..3..

Excerpts from Document PS 1780 (USA 72

JODL's Diary of 1937/39

Presented by the American Prosecution on the morning of 29 Nov 1945, as on Page 306 of the German Minutes.

H0673 - 0027

1938

.....

11 Feb In the evening and on 12 February General K. with General V.REICHENAU and SPERRLE at the Obersalzberg. SCHUSCHNIGG together with G. SCHMIDT are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours SCHUSCHNIGG signs protocol.

13 Feb In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer's order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

.....

14 Feb At 2:40 o'clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives.

I hereby certify that the above document is a true excerpt from Doc. PS 1780 (USA 72).

NUERNBERG 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673 - 0028

H0673-0029

(Page 25 line 1 to end)

Cover sheet to document Jo 10

Excerpt from PS 1780 (USA 72)

JODL's Diary 1937/39

Presented by the American Prosecution on 29 November 1945 in the forenoon, according to page 356 of the German minutes.

H0673 - 0030

Jo 10
(Excerpt from PS 1780)

1938
(undated) The Fuehrer states that after the annexation of Austria the cleaning up of the Czech question is not urgent.
The Fuehrer's question (not to touch on the Czech problem yet) is altered by the Czech deployment on 21.5. which is proceeding without any German threat and without even any apparent cause. Among its consequences, owing to the silence of Germany, this leads to a loss of prestige for the Fuehrer, which he is not now willing to accept. Hence the issue on 30.5. of the new directive for "Green".

Sharp opposition between HITLER and Army leaders:
he says: "We must still do it this year, the Army says " we cannot".

21.6. -
24.7. Leave

8.9. General Stulpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and that Italy according to CANARIS' report is reserved.
I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

H0673 - 0031

21.9. ..... 12.15 hours communication about this to General HANSEN, Chief of Operations Division, with the request to answer 2 questions before 5 o'clock.

What is to happen

a) if before the 28th the Fuehrer

b) if after the 28.9 the Fuehrer wants to march into the German-speaking area.

.....

28.9. ..... 15.15 hours. Important that we should not be misled into military actions by false reports before the answer from Prague.

I hereby certify that the above reproduced document is a literal excerpt from documnt PS 1780 (USA 72)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Professor Dr. EXNER

H0673-0032

Cover Sheet to Document Jo 11

Excerpt from 388-PS (USA 26) Item 14

Case "Green"
(Fall Green)

Submitted by the American prosecution on 26 Nov. 1945 in the Morning according to page 174 of the German transcript.

H0673 - 0033

JO 11
Excerpt from PS 388

Written by an officer.

Top Secret

Top Secret

18 June 1946

Only Via officer

1st Draft for the new directive.

Part 1

4 Copies
1st copy

GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES

1.) There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states against Germany.

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict of foreign powers.

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable political opportunity to realize this aim from 1 Oct 1938 on.

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain indefferent even though they could not be previously placed with absolute certainty in one of these categories.

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore

H0673 - 0034

Jo 11 continued

(Excerpt from PS 388)

England will not intervene.
. . . .

(sig.) K.

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbation excerpt from document PS 388 (USA 26.

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. Exner

Cover sheet of Document Jo. 12

Excerpt of PS 1780 (USA 72)

JODL's Diary 1937/1939

Presented by the American Prosecution on 29 November 1945 in the morning session in accordance with page 356 of the German transcript.

H0673-0035

H0673-0036

(Excerpt of PS 1780)

1938

.....

14. Sept. At noon it is announced abroad that the general order for mobilization had been posted in Czechoslovakia.

.....

This however did not take place, although approximately eight age groups were called up with short term induction orders. Since the Sudeten-Germans are crossing the border en masse, we are requesting at around 1730, at the suggestion of the High Command of the Army, 2nd Department, the calling up of the G.A.D. (Frontier Guard Service) along the Czech border in the service commands VIII, IV, XIII, and XVII. The Fuehrer gives his authorization from Munich.

.....

23 Sept. The demonstrations in Prague are increasing in volume. The Communist wave has been officially confirmed. The increase in the Czech spirit of resistance is assumed to be the result of statements of the French Military Commission.

.....

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above is a verbatim excerpt from Document PS 1780 (USA 72).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

Cover sheet of Document Jo. 13.

Excerpt from PS 1780 (USA 72)

JODL's Diary 1937/1939

Presented by the American Prosecution in the morning session of 29 November 1945 in accordance with page 356 of the German transcript.

H0673 – 0037

(Excerpt from PS 1780)

1938

.....

22 September The Chief of Ausl.Capt.(Navy) BUERKNER reports that according to an intercepted long-distance telephone conversation between Prague and the local Czech Legation Councillor (Gesandtschaftsrat) the German Embassy in Prague was just about to be stormed. I am immediately initiating liaison by telephone and wireless with Prague through Colonel Jurpe.

At 1030 hours BUERKNER reports that the report has not been confirmed. The Foreign Office (A.A.) has spoken with our Embassy.

At 1035 hours I establish liaison with Prague and with TOUSSAINT. To my question as to how he is getting along he replies, thanks, excellently. The Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Ob.dL) who had been informed of the first report with the suggestion to think over what measures would have to be taken if the Fuehrer requests an immediate bombardment of Prague is oriented through Counterintelligence (Ic) about the false report which may have had the purpose of causing us to perform a military act.

.....

..... 1515 hours

26 September It is important that because of false reports we do not permit ourselves to be induced to perform military actions before Prague replies.

.....

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above is a verbatim excerpt from Document PS 1780 (USA 72)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof.Dr.EXNER.

H0673-0038

Coversheet to Document Jo 14

Excerpts from PS 388 (USA 26)

Case "GREEN"

(Fall Gruen)

Submitted by the American prosemtion on 26 November 1945 in the morning according to page 174 of the German transcript.

H0673 - 0039

Jo 14
.....
(Excerpt from PS 388)

Written by a General Staff Officer

Top Secret

Chef L

Top Secret
Only via Officer

Berlin, 24 August 1938

1 Copy

Notes

Timing of the X-order and the question of advance measures

The Luftwaffe's endeavor to take the enemy air forces by surprise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to prevent the fact of Germany's mobilization becoming known to Czechoslovakia on that day.

The army's efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X minus 3 and X minus 1, which will contribute to the smooth and rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X minus 1

To this the following must be said:

Operation "Gruen" will be set in motion by means of an "incident" in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provocation for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time by day and hour for this incident is of the utmost importance.

H0673-0040

Jo 14. continued

(Excerpt from PS 388)

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of X minus 1.

It can then bespontaneously answered by the giving of the X order at 1400 on X minus 1.

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely receive an advance warning.

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further discussion is superfluous.

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall otherwise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for absolutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and camouflaged with the help of the numerous maneuvres and exercises.

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident.

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed neutral powers.)

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be considered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be X day, but it must be the day after that.

H0673 - 0041

(Page 38 of Orig.)

Jo 14 continued

(Excerpt from PS 388)

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and that the swiftast possible action must be taken after the incident. (X-Fall)

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great interest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be informed of the Fuehrer's intentions in good time - insofar as the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization of the incident.

I request that the Fuehrer's decision be obtained on these points.

J.

(handwritten) (JODL's initial)

Notes:

Submitted on 30 Aug

The Fuehrer will act on these lines.

On 31 Aug Col.General Staff JODL notified.

Schm 31 Aug

(SCHMUNDT's initial)

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 388 (26).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. MEYER

H0673 - 0042

H0673-0043

Coversheet to Document Jo 15

Excerpts from PS 388 (USA 26)

Case "GREEN"

(Fall "Gruen")

Submitted by the American prosecution
on 26 November 1945 in the morning
according to the German transcript.

H0673-0044

Jo 15

(Excerpt from PS 388)

L Ia

Written by an officer

2. DRAFT

Top Secret — Berlin, 7 July 38

Top Secret
only via officer — 2 copies
1st copy

Part 3

CONSIDERATIONS

I. In connection with "Gruen".

How the political situation will develop during the execution or after the conclusion of "Gruen" cannot be predicted. Therefore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to "Fall Gruen" and "Fall Rot". However, it seems expedient to make at least theoretical considerations and calculations for several possible eventualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considerations would have to cover:

a) What would have to be done if other nations intervened against us during the execution of "Gruen" -- contrary to our expectations.

b) What should be done after the conclusion of "Gruen".

To a) . . . . .

To b) If the action "Gruen" takes place still during this mobilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion of "Gruen" to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly into force.

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German frontiers, including the new additions

H0673-0045

Jo 15 continued

(Excerpt from PS 388)

by the Armed Force, and still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future strategic concentration, "Frontier Protection", into force separately for the various frontiers.

.....

(sig) K.

I herewith certify that the above verbatim document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 388 (USA 26)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

Structure

of the High Command of the Armed Forces as Working Staff

of the Fuehrer

Already presented on 3.4.1946 by Dr.NELTE for the defendant KEITEL

under K la

H0673 – 0046

Excerpt from PS 1780 (USA 72)

JODL's Diary 1937/1939

Presented by the American Prosecution on 29 November 1945 in the morning session in accordance with Page 356 of the German transcript.

H0673-0047

17

Document Jo .....

(Excerpt from PS 1780)

1939

.....

24 August .... 1750 hours. Schmundt has returned from Obersalzber. Hints that the Fuehrer is not quite certain anymore if England is not going to be serious this time; he, however, does not want the conflict with England.

.....

I herewith certify that the document reproduced above is a verbation excerpt from Document PS 1780 (USA 72).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. Exner.

H0673 - 0048

H0673 - 0049

Document Jo 18

Excerpt from Document C 64 (GB 86)

Report of the Supreme Commander of the Navy to the Fuehrer on 12 December 1939 concerning NORWAY.

Submitted by the British prosecution on 9 January 1946 in the afternoon according to page 2241 of the German transcript.

H0673 - 0050

Jo 18
(Excerpt from C 64)

Top Secret

Report by the Supreme Commander of the Navy to the Fuehrer on 12 December 39, at 12,00 noon (Present: General KEITEL, Brig. Gen. JODL, Commander PUTTKAMER)

Subject: The Norwegian Question

.....According to QUISLING's conviction, an agreement about Norway's occupation exists between England and Norway. In that case, Sweden also would take a position against Germany. The danger of Norway's occupation by England threatens greatly; possible in a short time. .....

(signed) RAEDER

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 64 (GB 62).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0051

Coversheet for Document Jo 19

Excerpt from L 52 (USA 540)

Memorandum of the Fuehrer about the Conduct of the War in the West.

Submitted by the British prosecution on 4 January 1946 in the afternoon according to page 1973 of the German transcript.

H0673-0052

(Excerpt from L 52)

Memorandum and Directives for Conduct of the War in the West

Berlin, 9 October 39

.....

(Page 9) RUSSIA:

By no treaty or pact can a lasting neutrality of Soviet-Russia be ensured with certainty. At present all reasons speak against Russia's departure from this state of neutrality. In eight months, one year, or even several years this may be altered.....

.....

.....

(Page14) The NORDIC STATES:

Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality in the future is also to be assumed, The continuation of German trade with these countries appears possible in a war of long duration.

.....

The Dangers to the German Position:

(Pages 17/18).....

The greatest, and most difficult danger lies in the following:
The essential factor for each victorious conduct of the war is to safeguard Ruhr production. Each serious stoppage in production in this area cannot be made good elsewhere. Sooner or later this must lead to the collapse of the German war-economy, and thus of the capacity to resist.

H0673-0053

Jo 19 continued

(Excerpt fom L 52)

But the enemy knows this too.

.....

(Pages 19/20) As long as neutral Belgium and Holland remain as protective zones in front of the Ruhr, attack by aircraft is still somewhat difficult, bombardment by long-range artillery impossible. But, in the event of the cessation of Belgian-Dutch neutrality, the military boundary would be withdrawn to a distance which would bring at least the South-West Ruhr zone within the range of super-long-range guns, and [illegible] Duesseldorf, even within the range, even of long-range batteries. From this moment the Ruhr, as an active factor of the German war-economy, would either drop out or at least be crippled. There is no means of replacing it.

As this weakness is recognized just as clearly by England and France as by ourselves, an Anglo-French conduct of war aiming at the utter destruction of Germany will strive to reach this goal at all costs. Indeed, the less hope England and France have of being able to destroy the German armed forces in a series of actual battles, the more both states will strive to create the conditions for an effective long-drawn out war of attrition and annihilation. But this condition requires the moving up of Anglo-French forces to the German frontier with a consequent termination of Belgian-Dutch neutrality.

H0673-0054

Jo 19 continued
(Excerpt from L 52)

(Page 22)

The possible course of action

Under not circumstances are France and England compelled to violate the Belgian-Dutch frontier by attack, thereby attacking these countries. Their means of exerting pressure are, as already indicated, so vast and so forceful, that they will succeed at any time in causing both countries to give up their neutrality at any particular mement which seems suitable, or necessary to the English or French Governments.

.....

Time of the attack:

.....

In spite of this - in the event of an early surprise attack by French formations against Belgian or Dutch territory - a line NORTH of AACHEN and in HOLLAND offering better defensive possibilities will be reached at all costs.

.....

Copy.

The contents of this memorandum is only for the personal knowledge of the Supreme Commanders as well as for the Chief of the OKW.

They are liable for secrecy.

Jo ...19... continued

(Excerpt from L 52)

Distribution:

1.) Supreme Commander of the Army

General VON BRAUCHITSCH,

2.) Supreme Commander of the Navy

Grand Admiral Dr. H. C. RAEDER,

3.) Supreme Commander of the Air Force

General Field Marshal GOERING

4.) Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

General KEITEL.

Berlin, 9 October 1939

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim except from document L 52 (USA 540)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof Dr. EXNER

H0673-0055

Excerpts from PS 1809 (GB 88)

JODL's Diary 1940

Presented by the American Prosecution on the morning of 7 Dec 1945, as on Page 858 of the German Minutes.

H0673-0056

H0673-0057

Copy!

2 Copies
2nd Copy

General JODL's Diary (WFA), containing events of 1 Feb. to 26 May 1940

1 Feb 1940 The Fuehrer request...

10 March ...The news about the Finnish-Russian negotiations are very favorable, from a political point of view. The French Press rages about it because they consider it necessary to cut Germany off from the Swedish ore.

.....

13 March Fuehrer does not yet give order for "W". He is still looking for some justification.

.....

24/
25 March Fuehrer at Obersalzberg....
No special events.
The English start to molest our merchantmen in the Danish and Norwegian territorial waters, or even fire at them.

.....

19 April .....
Chief of the Armed Forces High Command leaves room, leadership chaos is again threatening, because even details are being overruled from above, and all orderly work of the competent military leadership (Navy High Command and Gr.XXI) is in vain.

20 April .....
It seems that reports of the Air Force have induced the Fuehrer to form the opinion that the Norwegians are already conducting guerilla warfare and sabotage on a large scale. Already on the 19th, I contradicted such an opinion. We must not lead the Norwegians to passive or even active resistance, because that is precisely the aim of the English, after all.

H0673-0058

(Excerpt from PS 1809)

.....

24 April .....

BOEHME brings English orders for the entire project of Norway's occupation by the English. .....

.....

26 April .....

Major SCHTMAN reports about the interrogation of the Englishmen, and delivers additional important documents, among them the secret chain of command (Rangliste). At noon, the first prisoners arrived in Berlin. They are being interrogated in the Alexander Barracks (Alexander-Kaserne) and confirm the authenticity of the orders. All material is handed over to the Foreign Office.
.....

.....

24 May .....

Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.

.....

25 May .....

The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension.....

I hereby certify that the above document is a true excerpt from Doc. PS 1809 (GB 86).

NUERNBERG 12 March 1946

Prof.Dr. EXNER.

H0673-0059

Coversheet of Document J• 21

Excerpt from Document C 62 (GB 106)

Fuehrer Directive No. 6 - Conduct in the West

Submitted by the British prosecution on 7 December 1945 according to page 889 of the German transcript.

H0673-0060

Jo 21
(Excerpt from C 62)

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
O ... No. 172/39 Top Secret WFA/L

Berlin, 9 Oct 1939.

Top Secret
(Handwritten initials)

8 Copies
2nd Copy

Top Secret only via Officer

Directive No. 6.

For the Conduct of the War

(1) If it becomes evident in the near future that England, and France, acting under her leadership, are not disposed to put an end to the war, I am determined to take active and offensive action without letting much time elaps:

(2) A long waiting period results not only in the ending to the advantage of the Western Powers, of Belgian, and perhaps also of Dutch neutrality, but also strengthens the military power of our enemies to an increasing degree, causes confidence of the neutrals in German final victory to wane, and does not help to bring Italy to our aid as a brother-in-arms.

(3) I therefore issue the following orders for the further conduct of military operations:

a) Preparations should be made for offensive action on the northern flank of the western front crossing the area of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland. This attack must be carried as soon and as forcefully as possible.

b) The object of this attack is to defeat as strong sections of the French Fighting Army as possible, and her ally and partner in the fighting, and at the same time to acquire as great an area of Holland, Belgium and Northern France as possible, to use as a base offering good prospects for waging aerial and sea warfare against England and to provide ample coverage for the vital district of the Ruhr.

(handwritten note:)
No!

(signed) Adolf HITLER

H0673-0061

Jc 21 continued
(Excerpt from C 62)

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 62 (GB 106).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

(Page 58
of Orig.)

Coversheet to Document Jo 22

Excerpt from Document PS 789 (USA 23)

Speech by HITLER to the Supreme Commanders on 23 November 1939.

Submitted by the American prosecution on 5 December 1945 in the morning according to page 714 of the German transcript.

H0673-0062

H0673-0063

(without heading)

23 November, 1200 hours: Conference with the Fuehrer to which all Supreme Commanders have been ordered. The Fuehrer stated the following:

. . . . . .

Page 5) ..... Now the situation is as follows: the opponent in the West lies behind his fortifications. There is no possibility to attack him. .....

.....

Page 9) ..... We have one Achilles heel: the RUHR. The progress of the war depends on the possession of the RUHR. If England and France push through Belgium and Holland into the Ruhr, we shall be in the greatest danger. That could lead to the paralizing of the German power of resistance. .....

Page 10) ..... If the French Army marches into Belgium in order to allack us, it will be toolate for us. We must anticipate then. .....

(No signature)

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document 789 (USA 23).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

Excerpts from PS 1809 (GB 88)

JODL's Diary 1940

Presented by the American Prosecution on 7 Dec 1945 as on Page 858 of the German Minutes.

Copy!

General JODL's Diary (WFA),

contained 1 Feb to 26 May 1940

.....

19 March Fuehrer returns from the conference with the Duce beaming with joy and very much satisfied. Complete harmony, ...
Balkan should and must remain quiet. Complete understanding for Fuehrer's cooperation with Stalin.

I hereby certify that the above document is a true excerpt from Document PS 1809 (GB 88).

NUERNBERG 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER.

(Page 62
of orig.)

Coversheet of Document Jo 24.

Excerpt from PS 1541 (GB 117)

Directive No. 20

Operation " Marita "

Submitted by the American prosecution
on the afternoon of 7 December 1945
according to page 908 of the German transcript.

H0673-0067

Jo 24
(Excerpt from PS 1541)

Top Military Secret

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces High Command/ armed forces.
Command Staff/ armed forces
Section L No. 33 406/40

Top Secret

Matter of Chief
Only through Officer

Fuehrer #9
13 December 1940

(illegible notations)

12 Copies
9th Copy

Direction Number 20
Operation Marita

1.) The result of the battles in Albania is not yet decisive. Because of a dangerous situation in Albania it is doubly necessary that the British endeavor be foiled to create air bases under the protection of a Balkan front, which would be dangerous above all to Italy as well as to the Rumanian oil fields.

2.) My plan therefore is:

a) .....

b) After the setting in of favorable weather, probably in March, to send this task force for the occupation of the Aegean North coast by way of Bulgaria, and if necessary to occupy the entire Greek mainland (Operation Marita).

3.) .....

4.) The Operation Marita itself is to be prepared on the following basis:

a) The primery mission of the operation is the occupation of the Aegean coast, and the Bay of Saloniki. It may be necessary to continue the attack across Larissa and the Isthmus of Corinth.

5.) .....

6.) .....

7.) .....

(signed) Adolf HITLER

certified correct

(handwritten)

v. TROTHA

Captain, General Staff

I hereby certify that the document reproduced above is a verbatim excerpt from Document PS 1541 (GB 117).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER.

H0673-0068

H0673-0069

Covering sheet of Document Jo 25

Excerpt from PS 444 (GB 116)

Directive No. 18 - Guiding principles for the High Commands in regard to preparatory measures for the prosecution of the war dated 12 November 1940.

Submitted by the British prosecution on the afternoon of 7 December 1945 according to page 907 of the German transcript.

H0673-0070

TOP SECRET

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander	Fuehrer's Headquarters
of the Armed Forces	12 November 40
	2F 408
WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K.Chefs	
Only by officer	10 copies
	4th copy
Directive No. 18	55

(Page 1) The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution of the war in the near future are to be made along the following lines:-

1.) Relations with France. . . .

2.) Spain and Portugal . . .

3.) Italian offensive against Egypt . . .

(Page 7) 4.) Balkans.

The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria.

It will not be possible to count on the railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into position. . .

5.) Russia

Political discussions have been iniated with the aim of clarifying Russia's attitude for the time being.

H0673-0071

Jo 25 continued

(Excerpt from PS 444)

Irrespective of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the East which have already been verbally ordered will be continued...

J.

(JODL's initial)

(signed) Adolf HITLER

I hereby certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 444 (GB 116)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

Coversheet to Document Jo 26

Excerpt from Document C 127 (GB 125)

Directive No. 25

Yugoslavia

Submitted by the American prosecution on 7 December 1946 in the afternoon according to page 919 of the German transcript.

Excerpt from C 127

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces

Fuehrer's Headquarters
27 March 41

OKW/WFST/Abt.L(IOp)No.44 379/41 top secret, top secret

12 Copies
2nd Copy

top secret
only via officer

(various initials)

Directive No. 25

1.) The military Putsch in Yugoslavia has altered the political situation in the Balkans. Yugoslavia must, in spite of her protestations of loyalty for the time being, be considered as an enemy and therefore be crushed as speedily as possible.

2.).....

3.).....

4.).....

5.).....

signed

ADOLF HITLER

Distribution:

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 127 (GB 125).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0074

Coversheet to Document Jo 27

Excerpt from Document PS 1746 (GB 120

(GB 120)

Part 3

Proposal for the coordination of the German and Italian operations against Yugoslavia of 28 March 1941

Submitted by the British prosecution on 7 December 1945 according to page 916 of the German transcript.

H0673-0075

Jo 27

(Excerpt from PS 1746,

Part 3)

The Chief of the Armed Forces

Operational Staff
Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab)

Top Secret

Only Via Officer

Berlin, 28 March 41

(in JODL's handwriting)

Given to General von

RINTELEN at 1600 hours on

28 March 1941.

Proposal

for the coordination of the German and Italien operations against Yugoslavia.

1.) In the event that the political development requires an armed intervention against Yugoslavia, it is the German intention to attack Yugoslavia in a concentric way as soon as possible, to destroy her armed forces and to dissolve her national territory.

2.). . . . . .

3.). . . . . .

4.). . . . . .

5.). . . . . .

J.

(JODL's initial)

This is to certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 1746 (GB 120).

Nuernberg, 13 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER.

Coversheet to Document Jo 28.

Excerpt from R 95 (GB 127)

Deployment Instruction for "Action 25"

(Yugoslavia)

Submitted by the American prosecution on 7 Dec 1945 in the afternoon ,,

according to page 922 of the German transcript.

H0673-0077

JO 28

(Excerpt from R - 85)

Copy

Supreme Command of the Army

H.Q.,OKH, 30 March 1941

Army Gen. Staff, Dept. Ops. (I)

No. 540/41 top secret top secret

Deployment Instructions for "Action 25"

as well as supplementary instruction for action

"Marita".

1.) The political situation in the Balkans having changed by reason of the Yugoslav military revolt, Yugoslavia has to be considered as an enemy even should it make declarations of loyalty at first.

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided therefore to destroy Yugoslavia as quickly as possible.

For camouflaging purposes the operation shall be called "Action 25".

2.) . . . . .

3.) . . . . .

4.) . . . . .

5.) . . . . .

6.) . . . . .

7.) . . . . .

8.) . . . . .

d) Participation of Bulgaria:

Should Bulgarian forces participate actively in the attack on Yugoslavia, Army High Command 12 has to make the necessary arrangements with the Bulgarian Army Command. Bulgarian forces to be deployed against Yugoslavia are to be subordinated to the German military authorities.

H0673-0078

(Page 74 of Orig.)

Jo 28 continued

(Excerpt from R 95)

9.) .....

(signed) VON BRAUCHITSCH

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document R 95 (GB [illegible]).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0079

Cover Page of Doc. Jo 29

A.J. 13
Filed June 5, 1946

Excerpt from C 60

Order of the Fuehrer regarding attitude towards all naval combat vessels in the Greek territorial waters of the island Crete, of 24 March 1941.

H0673-0080

Jo 29

(Excerpt from C 60)

Top Secret

High Command of the Armed Forces FUEHRER H.Q. 24 March 1941

"WFST"/Dept. L (I Op) No. 00504/ Top Secret

(Handwritten initials)

8 copies
copy

Subject: Reconnaissance and attack within Greek territorial waters of the Island of Crete.

Top Secret
By officer only

(Handwritten initials

Effective immediately, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Army has authorized reconnaissance and attack against all naval forces (including Greek forces) within Greek territorial waters surrounding the Island of Crete.

The Chief of the High Command
of the Army

By Order

(handwritten) JODL

Supreme Commander of the Navy
[illegible] 378/41
Recd.: 25 March 41
Enclosures: -

Distributions:

Supreme Command of the Air Force, Air Force General Staff Ia	1st copy
" " " " Army (Information)	2nd "
" " " " Navy, naval situation report	3rd "
Chief, Armed Forces operational Staff	4th "
" , Air; same copy for War Diary	5th "
Air I L operational	6th "
" I H "	7th "
" I K "	8th "

I hereby certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from Document C 60.

NUERNBERG, 12 March 1946

Prof Dr. EXNER

H0673-0081

Excerpt from PS 1229 (USA 130)

Directive of the Army Leadership Staff to the Foreign Intelligence Office (Amt Ausl./Abw.) regarding material for the Intelligence Service (stronger coverage of the Eastern Territories) of 6 Sept 1940.

Presented by the American Prosecution on the afternoon of 7 Dec. 1945, as on Page 937 of the German Minutes.

H0673-0082

Jo .....30.....

(Excerpt from PS 1229)

Supreme command of the Armed Forces — Fuehrer headquarters, 6 Sept 1940

WFSt/ department L No. 33264/40

T O P S E C R E T

7 copies
4th copy

Subj.: Material for the intelligence service
Re. .: Counter intelligence (Abw.) III
398/40 top secret 26 August 1940.
OKH General Staff of the Army operational department Ia No. 150231/40 top secret, of 2 September 1940.

To: Foreign Counter intelligence service (Ausl./Abw.)

The Eastern territory will be manned stronger in the weeks to come. By the end of October the Status shown on the enclosed map is supposed to be reached.

.....

1.) .....

2.) .....

3.) When it comes to the equipment situation of the units, espec. of the armored divisions, things are to be exaggerated, if necessary.

4.) By suitable news the impression is to be created that the antiaircraft protection in the East has been increased considerably after the end of the campaign in the West and that it continues to be increased with captured French material on all important targets.

5.) .....

.....The supreme command of the Army (OKH) decides to what extent correct details, i.e. numbers of regiments, manning of garrisons etc. will be made available to the defense for purposes of counter-espionage.

The Chief of the supreme command of the armed forces

by order
signed: JODL

Distribution:

H0673-0083

(Excerpt from PS 1229)

I hereby certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 1229 (USA 130).

Nuernberg 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER.

H0673-0084

Excerpt from Document PS 376 (USA 161)

Letter by Major (General Staff) Frhr.v.FALKENSTEIN

of 29 October 1940

Submitted by the American prosecution on 10 December 1945 in the afternoon according to page 1021 of the German transcript.

H0673-0085

Jo .....31.....

(Excerpt from PS 376)

Major (General Staff) Freiherr v.FALKENSTEIN FUEHRER's H.Q.

20 Oct. 1940

Dear General:

In order to supplement today's telephone conversation of 10:00, I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief rasume of the military questions current here for your personal information before I go on leave. Major QUEISNER, my deputy, is informed of the question touched on here and can supply further information if necessary.

.....

1.) .....

2.) .....

3.) No orders respecting "Fall Ost" (Case East) have been given and no orders are to be expected at the moment.

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dismissed as a trifling matter.

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as ordered by the Fuehrer and are not to be speeded up.

4.) .....

5.) The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:-

SECRET

a) No other operational commitment,

b) Portuguese neutrality,

c) Support of France and Spain.

6.) .....

7.) .....

(Sgnd) FRHR.V.FALKENSTEIN

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from PS 376 (USA 161).

Nuernberg, 13 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER.

H0673-0086

Cover Page to Doc. Jo..32.....

Excerpts from PS 1809 (GB 88)

JODL's Diary 1940

Presented by the Americans Prosecution on the morning of 7 Dec. 1945, as on Page 858 of the German Minutes.

H0673-0087

(Excerpt from PS 1809)

Copy!

General JODL's Diary (WFA), containing

1 Feb to 26 May 1940

.....

24 May Position in the East threatened by Russian advance against Bessarabia.

I hereby certify that the above document is a true excerpt from Doc. PS 1809 (GB 88).

NUERNBERG 12 March 1946.

Prof. Dr.EXNER.

H0673-0088

Cover sheet to document Jo 33

Excerpt from document C 170 (USA 136)

Diary of the sea warfare administration

Submitted by the American Prosecution in the afternoon of 10 December 1946 according to page 951 of the German transcript.

H0673-0089

Jo 3

(Excerpt from C 170)

1940

.....

51) A 9,242 (p. 9) 24.5. Tension Russia/ Rumania: Anxiety about Russian march into Bessarabia.

.....

54) C VII/40, 211 (p. 9) 4.6. Supreme Commander of Navy at the Fuehrer's:

The Fuehrer states as his further aim: After the crushing of France, decrease of the Army, dismissal of older classes, particularly expert workmen. Center of gravity building up Airforce - Navy.

Of Russia there is no question as yet (note of Commander)

.....

67) A 11.235 (p. 11) 21.7. Baltic States declare union with Russia

.....

68) C VII/40, 251 (p. 12) 21.7. Supreme Commander of Navy at the Fuehrer's:

Fuehrer explains: England can hope

a) for America

b) for Russia, whose entry into the war would be particularly disagreeable for Germany on account of the threat from the air.....

.....

79) T.P. (p.14)

In August 1940 beginning of the German troop displacements to the Eastern frontier (after the proclamation of the Fuehrer on 22 June 41 T.P. of 23 June 41.

to No 79 (Supp. to p. 14)

Compare directives of Supreme Command of Wehrmacht (OKW) 27 August 40 in file "Sea Lion" directives of OKW I, vol. i, p. 26: displacement of 10 divisions and 2 armoured divisions

H0673-0090

to the Government-General in view of possible necessity for prompt interventinn for protection of Rumanian oil-producing area.

I certify herewith that the document reproduced above is a verbatim rendering of document C 170 (USA 136)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0091

Coversheet to Docuemtn Jo 34.

Excerpt from Document PS 446 (USA 31)

Directive No. 21 - Operation BARBAROSSA

Submitted by the American prosecution on 26 November 1945, according to page 199 of the German transcript.

H0673-0092

Docuemtn Jo .34.....

(Excerpt from PS 446)

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces

OKW/WFST/Abt.L(I)Nr.33 408/40 gK Chefs.

The Fuehrer's Headquarter

18 December 40

9 copies
4th copy

(Rubber Stamp) Top Secret
only via officer

Directive No. 21

Operation Barbarossa

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet Russia in a quick compaign before the end of the war against England.

(Operation Barbarossa)

.....

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended beginning of operations.

Preparations requiring more time to start are - if this has not yet been done - to begin presently and are to be completed by 15 May 1941.

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an attack will not be recognized.

..... (Initials v.Lg., J., W, K.)

signed Adolf HITLER

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document PS 446.

Nuernberg, 12 March 1945

Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0093

Coversheet to Jo 35

Excerpt from document J 39 (USA 138)

Time Table for BARBAROSSA

Submitted by the British prosection on 8 January 1946 in the afternoon according to page 2244 of the German transcript.

H0673-0094

Jo 35
(Excerpt from 039)

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
No. 44842/31 top secret, top secret WFSt/ Abt.L(I op.)

Fuehrer Headquarters

Top Secret

Top Secret
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6 June 1941)

The Fuehrer has approved the enclosed time table as the basis for further preparations for operation BARBAROSSA. If changes should become necessary in the course of events, it is to be reported to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces.

The Chief of the Supreme Command of
the Armed Forces

(signed) KEITEL

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Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

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(Handwritten note)

Corrected according to I op. 00910/41

(old pages 6 - 10 destroyed and replaced by new ones)

(Initial) 11 June 1941

Enclosure to OKW/WFSt/Abt.L (I Op.)
No. 44842/41 top secret: top secret.

Time Table Barbarossa.

Status of preparations on 1 June 1941

1.) General:

2.) Conversations with friendly states:

a.)....
b.)....
c.)....
d.)....
e.)....
f.)....

3.) Army:

a) West:
....

b) North:
.....

c) Balkans:
.....

d) East:
.....

4.) Navy:

.....

5.) Air Forces:

6.) Camouflage:

.....

H0673-0096

Jo ...35... continued
(Excerpt from C 39)

3.

Time	Current No.	Army - Air Force Navy OKW	Remarks
from 1 June	1	Start of Squadron 4b Duration until 22 June Transport to the East 4 Corps Commands 14 Armored Divisions 12 Infantry Divisions (Motorized)	Emphasis during the first part of the 4b-squadron parts of the air force, during the second part (Approx from 10 June on) mobile units of the army .....
	2	.....	

H0673-0097

Jo ...35..... continued
(Excerpt from C 39)

Time	Current No.	Army	Air Force	Navy	OKW	Remarks
22 June	35	Distribution of Forces for BARBAROSSA on the Day of Attack:				

Total Strength

(without units subordinated to Armed Forces Commander Norway):

80 Infantry Divisions
1 Cavalry Division
17 Armored Divisions
12 Infantry Divisions (Motorized)
9 Security Divisions
2 Verb. 15. Welle

also 2 Infantry Divisions for Army Reserves (have already arrived with 4b-squadron)

Air Fleet 4

with
43 Reconnaissance Squadrons
12 Fighter groups
one of which provisional
6 pursuit groups

Air Fleet 2 with

3 Reconnaissance Squadrons
10 Fighter Groups
8 Stuka Groups
2 Destroyer Groups
1 1/3 Combat Groups
9 Pursuit Groups
2 of them provisional

Air Fleet 1 with

2 Reconnaissance Squadrons
9 Fighter Groups
3 2/3 pursuit groups
2/3 of them provisional

36 .....

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 39 (USA 138).

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946 Prof. Dr. EXNER

H0673-0098

Coversheet to document JO 36

Excerpt from Document C 75 (USA 151)

Directive Bc. 24 Cooperation with Japan.

Submitted by the American prosecution on 10 December 1945 in the afternoon according to page 1002 of the German transcript.

H0673-0099

(Page 95
of Orig.)

JO 36
(Excerpt from C 75

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces
WFSt/ Abt. L (I op)

No. 44 282/41 top secret, top secret

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Directive No. 24

concerning the cooperation with Japan

(Page 1)

The Fuehrer ordered the following for the cooperation with Japan:

1.) The aim of the cooperation based on the Tri-Partite Pact will be to induce Japan to intervene actively in the Far East as soon as possible. . . .

2.) . . . . . .

(Page 2)

3.) The coordination of the mutual operational plans is charged to the Supreme Command of the Navy. The following directives apply here:

a.) To defeat England as quickly as possible and thus to keep the USA out of the war must be emphasized as the mutual aim of the conduct of the war. .....

b.)

c.)

d.) The loss of SINGAPORE as England's key position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of the war of the Tri Partite powers.

H0673-0100

Furthermore, attacks on other systems of bases of the English seapower on the American ones only when the entry of the USA into the war cannot be prevented - are appropriated to shake the system of power of the enemy there. . . . .

4.) . . . . .

5.). . . . .

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces

(Signed in the draft) KEITEL

Certified Correct

(Signed) JUNGE, Commander

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Wi. Rue. Ant.	8th Copy
HWK	9th Copy
Abt. L	10th to 14th copy

I herewith certify that the above document is a verbatim excerpt from document C 75 (USA 151)

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Professor Dr. EXNER

H0673-0101

Cover sheet for document Jo 37

Excerpt from document 3 119

Special regulations on conduct during occupation

of Denmark and Norway.

A.J. 14

H0673-0102

Jo 37
(Excerpt from C 119)

Gr.XXI
O.Qu/Qu 2 1/40 top secret, top secret
from x-day the regulation is secret

Gr-H. Qu., 13 March 40

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This order must be dispatched at the same time as the tactical regulations only.

Special regulations on conduct during the occupation of Denmark and Norway.

A. General.

1.) The military occupation of Denmark and Norway is taking place for the purpose of ensuring the neutrality of these countries. At the same time the objective must be to execute the same peacefully. Only where the German troops are met with resistance, must the latter be broken ruthlessly by weapons.

2.) .....

3.) .....

4.) .....

5.) The departure of War ships and ships engaged in foreign commerce must be forbidden with reference to blockade measures of the German navy. Release after the position has been clarified is reserved.

As a general prohibition of take-off will be decreed for aeroplanes aeroplanes of every kind must be prevented from ascending. Exempted from departure, or take-off restriction, are all War ships and ships engaged in foreign commerce flying the U.S.A. flag as well as aeroplanes. .....

.....

Enclosure 4

H0673-0103

(Extract from C 119)

Enclosure 4

Directive for conduct in personal relations with the Norwegian population.

Every member of the army must be aware that he is not entering enemy country, but that the troops are entering Norway for the protection of the country and for safety of its inhabitants.

Therefore the following is to be observed:

1.) The Norwegian has a strongly developed national consciousness. Moreover the Norwegian people feel themselves closely related to other Nordic people-

Therefore: avoid anything that might wound national honor.

2.) The Norwegian is extremely fond and conscious of liberty. He rejects all compulsion and inferiority. He has no taste for military discipline and authority.

Therefore: little bossing, no shouting! It fills him with antipathy and is ineffective. Explain and to convince objectively. Humorous tone goes the farthest. Unnecessary sharpness and tutelage offend his pride.

3.) The Norwegian is by his nature (like the Friesian peasant) taciturn and reserved, slow in thought and deed and in addition distrustful of strangers.

Therefore: No haste! Give time!

H0673-0104

(Excerpt from C 119)

4.) The home of the Norwegian is holy according to the Old-German conception. Hospitality is willingly practised. Property is invulnerable. House is left unlocked. Theft is almost unknown and is considered a disgrace.

Therefore: Refrain from any unauthorized encroachment even when goods are lying about openly. " To got hold of" " to organise " and the like are considered as theft and are prohibited under any circumstances.

5.) The Norwegian has no understanding for war. The seafaring and trading people have a leaning toward England. They feel related to their Finish brethren and are afraid of Russia. With a few exceptions they have no understanding for the aims of National Socialism.

Therefore: Avoid political discussions,

6.) The Norwegian leads a comfortable domestic life. He may be won through friendliness, through small attentions and appreciation of his personality. No obtrusive conduct towards women!

7.) German is understood almost everywhere. Taking for granted: slow and clear speech.

.....

(signed) von Falkenhorst.

I certify herewith that the above text is a verbatim excerpt from document C 119.

Nuernberg, 12 March 1946

Prof. Dr. EXNER